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Abstract
The Electoral College: Size Really Does Matter
Alexander Kirk

Committee members: Dr. George R. Goethals, Dr. Kenneth P Ruscio, Dr. David E. Wilkins

The goal of this paper is to explore and ultimately convince the reader of the merits of the
Wyoming Rule method of congressional apportionment as a method for altering the functioning
of the Electoral College in United States presidential elections. This is conducted through an
analysis of the role that the Electoral College has played throughout the history of American
elections, in depth looks at four common proposals for changing or replacing the Electoral
College, and finally discussion of the intricacies of the Wyoming Rule and the effects that it would
have on American politics.
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Chapter I: Introduction
In the throes of an election year, one can barely read, watch, or listen to the news without
coverage of an election. We love elections in the United States. We elect for at least three levels
of government, from mayor all the way up to President of the United States. We elect for at least
two branches of government; from Congress, state legislatures, and city councils to president,
governors, and mayors, and, sometimes, state judges. We do not only vote for people either. We
vote for ballot measures and constitutional amendments, too. We vote all the time in the United
States, so why does our most important election, that for president of the United States, seem
so broken? Why does it seem like it is not even an election at all? Why do 538 people that never
appear on television, never campaign for votes, and never hold office get to decide who the
president is?
Perhaps the most important questions, however, are those of the “how” variety. How did
we get here? How has the Electoral College played out in practice compared to its intended
purpose and historical role? And finally, how do we fix it? Or in other words, how do we take a
system, enshrined in the Constitution, and iron out its undemocratic tendencies? But even before
that, we need to identify what are its undemocratic tendencies that need to be ironed out. There
are no easy answers to these questions. Rational minds will disagree on the solutions, the scale
of the problems, and even the problems themselves, but that only makes them that much more
interesting to think, write, and speculate about.
So that is what we did. We thought about, wrote about, and speculated what some of
those problems and solutions are. To start, there is an examination of the how we got here,
starting with the Articles of Confederation and traversing through the final days of the
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Constitutional Convention. Next, we move through the most notable elections in United States
history, starting with the election of 1800. With each election, we examine how that election
either shaped or was shaped by the Electoral College. As we move closer to the present day and
the election of 2016, we start to consider political realities and how each election shapes the
contours of public opinion on the Electoral College.
With the history out of the way, the proposals for the future come next. Five alternatives
are postulated and explored in depth, each discussing the legality, winners and losers, impact on
minority groups—both demographically and factionally, and the perceived issue that the
proposal resolves. The proposals are named as follows: the automatic plan, direct election, the
congressional district plan, and the interstate compact. Each gets an in-depth look at their virtues
and shortfalls, as well as their chance of being implemented. However, there is one more plan
that gets special attention.
The final plan is the Wyoming Rule plan. More outside-the-box than the four before it,
the Wyoming Rule is my personal favorite for its combination of innovation and tradition that
solves what I view as the most significant underlying issue of the Electoral College, the relative
power of voters and states. In Chapter IV, the Wyoming Rule gets the full treatment of the four
plans before it plus extra detail on implementation and the math behind it all.
Finally, I give the pitch on why the Wyoming Rule is the way forward for the Electoral
College and the United States. As an unpartisan, amendment-free change to the Electoral
College, I believe it not only has the best chance of becoming law but is also the technical
correction the Electoral College needs to remain the electoral system of the United States for
centuries to come. Without further ado, let us take a step back in time to the summer of 1787.
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Chapter II: The Electoral College from Birth to Practice
A common refrain for those that are critical of the Electoral College is, “if we were starting
over, we would never have come up with the Electoral College as a system for electing the
president.” In order to adequately address that, we need to examine how the Framers got where
they did. How did they come up with the Electoral College as a system of electing the chief
executive of the United States when there were clearly much simpler and more straightforward
answers available to them? The answer, as with most questions surrounding the creation of the
United States Constitution, is compromise.
Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 through 4 of the United States Constitution lay out how the
President of the United States is to be elected. They read:
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall
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then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an
equal Number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
chuse [sic] by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority,
then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse
[sic] the President. But in chusing [sic] the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a Quorum for this
Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and
a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the
Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the
Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who
have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse [sic] from them by Ballot the Vice
President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] the Electors, and the Day
on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the
United States.”1
Although never mentioned specifically as the “Electoral College” throughout the entirety of the
document, the system described in the clauses above has come to be known as the Electoral
College. When examined through the modern lens, the system seems unnecessarily complex.

1

United States, The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787 (Public Domain, 1975), art. II, sec. 1, cl. 2-4,
Apple Books.
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Using voters to select other voters to then select the president seems like one step too many.
We already select congressmen, why not have them select the president? We count the popular
vote, why not use that instead? Before getting caught up in all the ways one can elect a public
official, one needs to recognize how the situation that the Framers found themselves in differed
from that of today.
The Articles of Confederation
When the Constitution was written in the summer of 1787 the Framers were not working
from a blank slate. Originally tasked with amending the Articles of Confederation, which had
governed the newly independent states since its ratification in 1781, many of the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention traveled to Philadelphia with the intention of doing just that.2
Faced with impending fiscal crises from the threat of defaulting on loans from the French and
Dutch, Congress nearly passed a federal impost on goods being imported into the states on two
occasions, 1782 and 1786.3 The first was singlehandedly quashed by Rhode Island and the second
by New York, fearful of the effect a new impost would have on the impost already being levied
on goods entering New York City.4 The latter failure to establish a federal tax proved to be the
last straw, finally bringing to bear the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation and
triggering calls for a convention to amend them.5
Just as the financial crisis was unfolding, Shays’ Rebellion began to take form in
Massachusetts, furthering the new nation’s domestic troubles.6 Faced with fiscal austerity and
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Richard R. Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution (New York: Random House,
2010), chap. 1, Kindle.
3
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1.
4
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1.
5
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1.
6
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men, chap. 1.
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aggressive tax collection by the state government, Captain Daniel Shays led a group of rural
Massachusetts men in a call to march on the government arsenal in Springfield and threaten an
armed insurgency.7 Eventually put down by a private militia organized by Massachusetts
governor James Bowdoin, the episode nonetheless further spurred calls for something to be done
with the Articles of Confederation.8 While the conflicts between the states on import tariffs and
the inability to raise an army to defend the country were perhaps the most salient reasons for
ditching the Articles of Confederation, a multitude of other factors did as well, including the
patchwork of laws and inconsistent treatment that American Indian tribes were subject to and
received from the various states.
Just as the dual crises were unfolding up north, a small group of delegates was gathering
in Annapolis, Maryland on September 11, 1786 to discuss another shortcoming of the Articles of
Confederation, the ability to establish uniform commercial regulations.9 Although only five states
sent delegates to the convention, leaving it far short of a quorum, the 12 men that did show up
were some of the staunchest supporters of a stronger central government in the United States.10
Led by Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson, James Madison, and Edmund Randolph, the 12
delegates prepared a letter for the Continental Congress requesting that a convention in May of
the following year convene in Philadelphia to amend the Articles of Confederation.11 However,
some of the men, especially Hamilton and Madison, had more ambitious plans in mind. Instead
of simply amending the Articles, they intended to scrap them altogether and create an entirely
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new government that was much less favorable to the states.12 When the proposed convention
won the approval of the Continental Congress in early 1787, a small group of men led by Madison
and Hamilton and joined by Edmund Randolph, Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, and Robert
Morris hatched plans to create a wholly new government.13
The Constitutional Convention
By some historical accounts, there was no fewer than three instances in which the method
of selection for the chief executive was discussed at the Constitutional Convention. The first such
instance came during the first discussion of the nature and powers of the executive branch of the
government. On Monday, June 4, 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania led the charge for a
unitary, powerful chief executive over the objections of significantly more well-known delegates
such as Edmund Randolph and George Mason of Virginia.14 Having settled on the nature of the
executive, the delegates started plotting out exactly how that executive would be chosen.
Although most supported some form of election by the national legislature, it was James Wilson,
whose name will come up often throughout this discussion, who first proposed direct election by
the people.15 Predictably, however, not a single delegate supported Wilson’s proposal.16 In
response to the resounding rejection of his plan for direct election by the people, Wilson laid the
groundwork for what would become the Electoral College.
Wilson proposed dividing the states into districts that would select “electors” who would
eventually meet and select the chief executive.17 The electors, he reasoned, would be of superior
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knowledge and sufficiently removed from their communities to be able to make a wise choice
while also giving the people at least an indirect say in the choice of the chief executive.18 Wilson
pictured these electoral districts holding elections for the electors, meaning that the people
inhabiting a district would vote for the elector they wanted to represent them when the
president was selected.19 While not exactly the direct election of the president that Wilson
preferred, the elector method still gave the people a voice. Favoring a strong and independent
executive, Wilson wanted to avoid the selection of the president by the national legislature,
fearing that the president would simply become a pawn of Congress and unable to act
independently and forcefully.20 The delegates recognized that other, more pressing issues
needed to be attended to, so they left it for discussion later.21
On July 17, Maryland’s Luther Martin offered a variation of Wilson’s proposal, proposing
that the electors be selected by the state legislatures instead of the people in the states.22 If the
president was simply elected by the state legislatures, he would be nothing more than a
powerbroker between the interests of the individual and factitious states.23 For that reason, this
proposal, too, was similarly rejected without further discussion on the topic, bringing a quick end
to the second mention of selection of the president.24
The third time that the issue of selecting the president was discussed was in early
September, not by the whole of the convention, but by the recently created Committee on
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Postponed Parts (certainly the most well-named of the committees conducting business at the
Convention.)25 Arriving late, John Dickinson of Delaware threw a wrench into the Committee’s
consensus on the selection of the president by the national legislature.26 Looking ahead to the
ratification fight, Dickinson predicted that people would refuse to give such immense power to a
chief executive that they could not choose directly.27 It is here that Madison jumped into action.
Drawing on Wilson’s proposal for election by a slate of electors, Madison sketched out a method
for selecting the president.28 The final recommendation of that committee, delivered and
debated on September 5, 1787, read:
“Hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the VicePresident, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz: Each
State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of
electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The
Electors shall meet in their respective State and vote by ballot for two persons, of
whom one at least shall be not be an inhabitant of the same State with
themselves; and they shall make a list of all persons voted for, and of the number
of votes for each. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be the
President, if such a number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be
more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes,
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then the Senate shall choose by ballot one of them for President: but if no person
has a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose by
ballot the President. And in every case after the choice of the President, the
person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice-President.”29
If the text sounds familiar to that in the Constitution, that is because it is. The only significant
change that came out of the full debate following the Committee’s report was that it would be
the House of Representatives that would choose the president while the Senate would choose
the vice-president.30 However, as a sort of compromise on the issue that favored small states
supportive of election by the Senate, each state delegation would get one vote, regardless of the
size of that delegation.31 Except for those two changes, Madison’s proposal coming from the
Committee on Postponed Parts is the one that ends up making it into the final text, creating the
Electoral College that persists to this day.
A common line of attack on the Electoral College today is that the Framers distrusted the
general American populace to make an informed decision about who should be the leader of the
country. In truth, it was only a small minority of the delegates who believed that the ordinary
citizens were not intelligent enough to make such a decision.32 Instead, most of them believed
that ordinary Americans were simply too ignorant to choose the president.33 Even though the
number of newspapers in the new republic was growing rapidly, most were still concerned
primarily with local matters.34 Additionally, the “news” that came out of other regions of the
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country was often not even news at all, accounting events weeks or months after they
happened.35 This, the Framers believed, combined with the sheer size of the country made it
logistically impossible to create an informed electorate.
Despite their foresight in avoiding direct election by an uninformed electorate, the
Framers grossly misestimated how often the contingency plan that they quibbled about so
ferociously would be needed. George Mason of Virginia quipped that, “Nineteen times in twenty
the president would be chosen by the Senate,” referring to the scenario in which no candidate
receives a majority of the electoral votes or two candidates tie with the most votes.36 Instead, in
the 58 presidential elections in United States history, only two have resulted in an electoral vote
outcome that needed to be settled by the House of Representatives, a far cry from the 95% of
elections that Mason had predicted.37 Mason also argued that election by the Senate would,
“convert that body into a real and dangerous aristocracy,” instead favoring election by the House
of Representatives.38 Wilson, still believing in the importance of popular will in the election of
the president, also favored election by the House, as is was the body more closely tied to the
popular will.39 In the end, it was Roger Sherman of Connecticut that put together the system of
votes by delegation that eventually won the day.40 Proposed at the end of the day on September
6, Sherman’s proposal was no one’s first choice, but after informal gatherings of delegates on the
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sidelines of the Convention worked out that Sherman’s was the least-worst option, a consensus
eventually formed around his idea.41
An interesting note regarding the Electoral College is the relatively little coverage it
received during the ratification fight following the conclusion of the Convention. Of the 85 essays
comprising The Federalist Papers, only one—Hamilton’s 68—considers the issue of the Electoral
College.42 Hamilton expounds on the virtues of the system as designed in avoiding the “cabal,
intrigue, and corruption” that are an existential threat to the survival of republican government.43
He points out that because the electors are to meet in the state in which they are elected and
not altogether in the seat of government, it, “will expose them much less to heats and ferments”
of the people than they would if they met in one place.44 Hamilton notes the specific and
temporary nature of the electors as a virtue as well. Because their only role is to select the
president, neither the electors nor the president himself would have much ulterior motive for
attempting to sway the outcome of the vote or changing behavior in order to curry favor with
more permanent and powerful individuals such as senators or representatives.45
The Role of the Popular Vote
A common feature of early American elections, especially those in the first part of the 19th
century, was a lack of popular votes. It was not until 1824, the tenth presidential election in
American history, that the Federal Archives even include a count of the popular vote in official
election results.46 It was not until the election of 1868, following the Civil War and the
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reconstruction of most of the southern states, that every state chose electors via some form of
popular vote, almost a century after the first presidential election in United States history.47
Election

Total Using Popular
Vote

Total Casting Electoral
Votes

Percentage Using Popular
Vote

1788

6

10

60.00%

1792

6

15

40.00%

1796

9

16

56.25%

1800

6

16

37.50%

1804

11

17

64.71%

1808

10

17

58.82%

1812

9

18

50.00%

1816

10

19

52.63%

1820

15

24

62.50%

1824

18

24

75.00%

1828

22

24

91.67%

1832

23

24

95.83%

1836

25

26

96.15%

1840

25

26

96.15%

1844

25

26

96.15%

1848

29

30

96.67%

1852

30

31

96.77%

47
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1856

30

31

96.77%

1860

32

33

96.97%

1864

25

25

100.00%

1868

34

34

100.00%

As one can see from the table, the number of states using the popular vote fluctuated until 1812,
bottoming out at half of the states and increasing until just one state, South Carolina, held out
until after the Civil War.48 The election of 1864 saw a decrease in the number of states casting
votes as eleven had seceded during the Civil War. Starting with the election of 1864 and
continuing to the present day, every state has used the popular vote in the state in order to select
electors in some way.49
Winner Take All
The ability of states to choose for themselves how their electors will be chosen is a power
granted by the same passage in the Constitution that creates the electoral system for selecting
the president.50 It is for this reason that many states and their legislatures were able to avoid
using the popular vote to select electors and thus concentrate power in the hands of state
political parties via the state legislature. However, given the latitude that states have in deciding
how their electors will be selected, it is rather peculiar that nearly every state quickly settled on
a winner-take-all system. When considered in the context of the early American republic though,
the reasons become clearer. Designed at a time in which people held great pride in their state of
origin and political parties were nowhere to be seen, states would work to maximize their sway
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on the national stage. The best way to do that would be selecting electors as a bloc that would
vote together, ensuring that no matter how slim a margin a candidate won a state by, that state
could maximize its preference for that candidate. As political parties began to take form, a similar
logic was applied. Seeking to maximize support for their preferred candidate, party leaders
designed systems that would effectively disenfranchise voters in the minority faction in their
states and give their candidate the best chance of winning nationally.
Faithless Electors
In all states but Maine and Nebraska, the party of the candidate who wins the popular
vote gets to have its preselected electors appointed as the state’s electors. Those electors usually
vote with the outcome of the popular vote in their state, ensuring that the candidate that wins
the state essentially receives all the electoral votes. Beyond just allowing the parties to select the
electors, some states include civil penalties for so-called “faithless electors” that fail to vote with
the popular vote in their state.51 However, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit recently ruled, states cannot force or coerce their electors into voting a certain way.52 As
the Constitution dictates, states have absolute authority over deciding how those electors will be
appointed and selected, but once they are selected, they hold no sway over their actions, just
like any other public official.53 While faithless electors often make headlines—there were ten
defectors in the 2016 election, the most ever—they have never changed the outcome of an
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election.54 However, the risk is always present so long as faithless electors remain an aspect of
the Electoral College, as the Framers designed it.
With such a unique system, it is expected that there are bound to be some unanticipated
and sometimes counterintuitive election outcomes. I will now go through some of the more
interesting ones in terms of their Electoral College outcome and their implications on United
States politics and elections, starting with the election of 1800.
19th Century Elections
The fourth presidential election in United States history featured a deeply unpopular
incumbent in President John Adams, and another founding father challenging him in Vice
President Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson “chose” Aaron Burr as his running mate, a career political
operative from New York, a key swing state in the election of 1800, with few concrete positions
on the issues of the day. However, as the election took place prior to the passage of the Twelfth
Amendment, electors cast two electoral votes each without indicating in any way whom they
wanted to be president and vice president.55 For the most part, both major parties had figured
out how to game the system to ensure that both their preferred president and vice president
were elected together. Electors from the party were instructed to choose both candidates on
their ballots while one elector would not select whoever was to be the vice president. This would
leave the leading vote-getter the president and the vice president one vote behind. For whatever
reason, an elector for the Republicans in the election of 1800 that was supposed to vote for
someone other than Burr did not, leaving Jefferson and Burr in a tie and throwing the election
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into the House of Representatives. Still controlled by the Federalists, the House went through 36
ballots and an intervention from Hamilton before finally electing Jefferson the third President of
the United States with Burr as his vice president.56 The entire episode spurred Jefferson to
propose the Twelfth Amendment, creating an independent election for vice president and
ensuring that the president and vice president will always be from the same party if a majority of
electoral votes are won.57 The election of 1800 was and will remain the only election in American
history that ended in a majority tie, as the passage of the Twelfth Amendment guaranteed that
no election can end that way again.58
The next election that will be explored is the first of the five “mismatches” in which the
winner of the popular vote does not win the electoral vote and thus the presidency. It is also the
only other election that has ever been decided by the House of Representatives. The election of
1824 was a four-man race between John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, William H. Crawford,
and Henry Clay.59 When the votes came in, Jackson had won a plurality of both popular and
electoral votes, but fell 32 electoral votes short of a majority.60 Following the provision of the
Twelfth Amendment that the top three vote-getters move into the House of Representatives,
Henry Clay was disqualified. What followed was what Jackson would decry as a “corrupt bargain”
in which Henry Clay pledged his support to Adams in exchange for being appointed Secretary of
State.61 Adams would go on to win the election in the House of Representatives despite being
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the second-highest vote-getter in the initial election.62 Adams’ luck would not continue, however,
as Jackson would come back and trounce him in the election of 1828.63 While not a “mismatch
election” in the sense that the person that won the popular vote lost the electoral vote, the
election of 1824 still resulted in the person that won the popular vote did not become President
of the United States.64 Although the election took a detour through the United States House of
Representatives before arriving at that conclusion, the end result was still the same as any other
mismatch election.
The election of 1860 is the third that provided an interesting electoral-popular
breakdown. Like the election of 1824, 1860 featured four candidates: Abraham Lincoln, John C.
Breckinridge, John Bell, and Stephen A. Douglas.65 Unlike 1824, Lincoln would win 60% of the
electoral vote with only 40% of the popular vote.66 As we move through history, we will see that
these “win more” elections are common, in which the winner of the popular vote wins a plurality
of the popular but a majority of the electoral, essentially creating a decisive winner where there
was not one. The interesting part of the election of 1860 is that even if Lincoln’s opposition had
been united behind a single candidate, he still would have won the electoral vote, only losing
California, Oregon, and New Jersey’s combined 14 electoral votes.67 Lincoln could have won a
presidential election against an opponent that won 60% of the popular vote. While it has never
really even come close to happening, an election between two candidates that results in a loser
that won 60% percent of the popular vote would likely result in a profound decline in trust in

62

The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
64
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
65
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
66
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
67
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Electoral College Results.”
63

20
American democracy that would either seriously threaten its continued existence or provide the
impetus for monumental change to the way presidents are elected.
The election of 1876 is the second of the mismatch elections in the United States. 1876 is
also the only of the five mismatch elections in which the loser of the election won a majority of
the popular vote; in all other cases the popular vote winner has only won a plurality.68 Contested
between Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel J. Tilden, the 1876 election is also the only one that
has been decided by a single electoral vote, handing Hayes the win despite a three-percentage
point popular margin in favor of Tilden.69
Just four years later, in the election of 1880, the opposite occurred in which a tiny popular
vote margin resulted in a large electoral margin. Separated by fewer than two thousand popular
votes out of nine million, James A. Garfield and Winfield Scott Hancock were separated by 59
electoral votes, or 29 more than were needed for Garfield to win a majority.70
The election of 1888 was the third election that would result in a mismatch, although not
as wide as the one in 1876. Benjamin Harrison would lose the popular vote by less than a
percentage point to his opponent Grover Cleveland but would still go on to win 58% of the
electoral vote and the presidency.71 The elections of 1824, 1876, and 1888 would be the only
elections that result in mismatches until the turn of the 21st century over one hundred years later.
20th Century Elections
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Moving into the 20th century, the election of 1912 was yet another in which four
candidates received a significant number of popular votes, although only three received electoral
votes. The winner, Woodrow Wilson, would win less than 42% of the popular vote but over 80%
of the electoral vote, owing to an opposition divided between Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft.72 The 40-percentage point spread between the popular and electoral vote shares
was easily the largest in the United States until that time and would only be surpassed just slightly
in 1980 by Ronald Reagan’s dominant victory over Jimmy Carter.73 Unlike in Lincoln’s election in
which a similar popular vote share would have won even with a united opposition, Wilson won
many of his states with less than 40% of the popular vote in that state, indicating that had he
been running against a united opposition, he would not have won.74 Against a united opposition,
Wilson would have lost all but Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—the 11 states that seceded from the
Union to start the American Civil War—winning only 126 electoral votes out of the 266 needed
to win the presidency.75
1968 sticks out as another curious election as it showed the power that regional
candidates can have on the outcome of the election. Contested between Richard Nixon, Hubert
Humphrey, and George Wallace, the 1968 election featured a strong regional candidate in
Wallace. With only 43% of the popular vote, Nixon would win both the plurality of the popular
and a majority of the electoral.76 While it is impossible to say whether Wallace’s presence in the
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race hurt Humphrey or Nixon more, Wallace’s 13% of the popular and 46 electoral votes showed
that a regional candidate with limited nationwide support could materially impact the outcome
of an election. Had Wallace’s votes gone for Humphrey instead, Nixon still would have won the
election although Humphrey would have polled 55% of the popular vote, putting Nixon’s victory
closer to Lincoln’s in 1860 than Wilson’s in 1912 in terms of electoral-popular math.77
1992 is the final of the 20th century elections that will be examined. Featuring Bill Clinton
and George H. W. Bush, the election of 1992 also included independent Ross Perot. Although not
winning any electoral college votes, Perot would win nearly 19% of the national popular vote.78
Whether Perot’s candidacy handed the election to Clinton by hurting Bush’s vote shares in
important states is up for debate, but Perot’s strong showing nonetheless stirred discussion
about the role that third-party candidates play in American elections. As discussed earlier, the
Electoral College essentially acts as a “win more” device, allowing a candidate that sometimes
falls far short of winning a majority of the popular votes to win a majority of the electoral votes.
This is certainly the case for Clinton as well, winning only 43% of the popular vote but 68% of the
electoral vote.79
21st Century Elections
The election of 2000 will stand in infamy for many reasons: hanging chads, dimpled chads,
time zone differences in the Florida panhandle, you name it. But there is one event that had not
happened in over a century that is of interest for its relationship to the Electoral College.
Contested between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the election of 2000 was the fourth mismatch
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election in United States history, with only half a percentage point in the popular vote separating
the candidates and Bush only two electoral votes over a majority.80 What ultimately came down
to 537 votes in Bush’s favor in Florida decided who would become president of the United States
and kicked off a fresh round of criticism of the Electoral College.81 However, the 2000 election
would only foreshadow the things to come.
The election of 2016 provides the last and perhaps most important lesson for the future
of the Electoral College in American politics, that is the extent to which someone can lose the
popular vote and still win the presidency. Contested between two deeply unpopular candidates
in Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, the 2016 election would result in the fifth mismatched
election in the United States. With almost three million popular votes and two-percentage points
favoring her, Clinton would end up losing the electoral vote to Trump by 12-percentage points.82
Contested during a period of intense polarization of American politics and resulting in a much
wider margin than Bush defeated Gore by in 2000, the 2016 election seems to be a harbinger of
things to come.
As Americans continue to move into more polarized and entrenched political camps, the
possibility for even wider mismatches is greater than ever. For example, as Democrats continue
pushing to the left and running up huge margins in states like California and New York, they will
continue winning increasingly large swathes of votes without any additional gain. Combined with
traditionally Republican states like Texas becoming more diverse and urbanized, trends that tend
to correlate with increasing support for Democratic candidates, the margins by which
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Republicans win those states will decrease, further skewing the popular vote in favor of the
Democrats without any change in the electoral vote.83 Additionally, the 2016 election saw a
record ten electors cast their votes for someone other than the person that won the popular vote
in their state, highlighting the risk that in a closer election, faithless electors breaking with the
vote in their state could have a serious impact on the final results and trigger a “stolen” election
that raises serious doubts about the efficacy of an electoral system that places the ultimate
decision in the hands of 538 people.84
With an understanding of how the Electoral College came into being and the way that it
has played out in practice throughout American history, we can move into the present. Following
the election of 2016 and the unprecedented disparity between the popular vote and the electoral
vote, calls for something new have arisen. Ranging from the abolition of the Electoral College to
simple tweaks of its functioning, the alternatives that have been proposed all seek to remedy
perceived shortcomings of the Electoral College. Thus, it is vital that any discussion of how to
change the system starts with a discussion of the system itself, just as we have done. With that
out of the way, we can leave the history of American elections behind and see how those
elections might play out in the future.
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Chapter III: The Alternatives
With an understanding of where the Electoral College came from and how it has played
out in practice as an electoral tool, we can move to consider some alternatives that have been
proposed were the Electoral College to be replaced. The four proposals that will be covered in
this chapter—the automatic plan, direct election, the congressional district plan, and the
interstate compact—have all been floated in one form or the other as possible alternatives by
authorities in media, journalism, and political science. Each proposal will be evaluated on a
number of measures including legality, winners and losers, impact on minority groups, and how
it addresses some of the perceived issues of the system it would be hypothetically replacing, the
Electoral College.
The Reasons for Change
The reasons for seeking an alternative to the Electoral College are numerous and come in
both partisan and nonpartisan flavors. A common partisan one, especially among Democrats, is
that two of the last five elections have been “stolen” from their candidate due to the quirks of
the Electoral College. In both 2000 and 2016, Al Gore and Hillary Clinton won a plurality of the
popular vote without winning a majority of the Electoral College vote which instead awarded the
presidency to George W. Bush and Donald Trump, respectively.85 This argument, taken alone,
almost certainly would find no support on the other side of the aisle. If Democrats want to change
the electoral system of the United States, which was fully known and transparent to all
candidates and parties, to suit their candidates and their electoral prospects, why should
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Republicans not fight all the same for the maintenance of the system that has delivered them
40% of the last five elections and appears likely to do so again in 2020?
As recently as the 1970s, however, Congress made a serious effort at eliminating the
Electoral College in its entirety. Under the stewardship of Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, doing
away with the Electoral College in favor of a nationwide popular vote was a nonpartisan issue.86
Although the effort was ultimately unsuccessful, it remained a non-partisan issue up until the
election of 2000, when the Republican Party was prepared to renew efforts against the Electoral
College had Al Gore won a majority of the electoral vote while losing the popular vote as polls
had predicted at the time.87 When, in fact, the opposite happened, political realities took hold
and the Republican Party moved strongly in favor of the Electoral College.88
As for the nonpartisan arguments, most boil down to a simple concern: that the Electoral
College is antithetical to democracy because it sometimes fails to reflect the popular will of the
people. When framed as an afront to democracy and not as a partisan issue, the arguments for
doing away with the Electoral College in favor of another system hold much higher levels of face
validity as the motivations of advocates cannot be dismissed as strictly partisan. However, even
in the context of nonpartisan arguments and agreements about the nature of the Electoral
College, one can never divorce the virtue of such a change for American democracy from the
reality such a change would have on the alignment of political power.
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One final note before addressing the proposals mentioned above: no analysis will be
conducted as to who would have won in specified elections if such a system existed except for
purposes of illustrating the workings of the system in the context of an actual election. The
statement made earlier regarding an electoral system that has clear and consistent rules that are
transparent and known to all involved would apply in all situations as they happen, but judging
campaigns and election outcomes of the past on a different set of rules that was unknown to
participants would be superfluous. Saying that under a congressional district plan, Hillary Clinton
would have won the Electoral College by a certain amount is futile because it assumes that
everything leading up to the election would have remained exactly the same. The campaigns, the
advertising spending, and even the platforms of the respective candidates and parties would all
be different if the path to the presidency was altered. Simply changing the rules of the game ex
post and analyzing the results would not provide any reliable information on the impacts of such
a change, so it will not be done in this paper.
The Automatic Plan
The first alternative that will be discussed, the automatic plan, is the simplest and most
straightforward of the plans, both in terms of execution and deviation from the Electoral College
of today. The automatic plan leaves everything about the Electoral College intact except for the
use of electors that actually cast the votes. As currently constructed, the Electoral College
consists of states determining on their own how they will select the electors that will cast the
votes for president.89 The number of electors a state is permitted to allocate is a straightforward
calculation of the number of representatives a state is allocated in the House of Representatives
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plus the number of senators a state is allocated in the Senate.90 As every state is allocated two
senators and a minimum of one representative, the fewest electors that a state can allocate is
three while the most populous state, California, is allocated 55 for each of the 53 representatives
that the state sends to the House and the two senators it sends to the Senate.91 Under the
passage laying out the method of selection in the Constitution, it is made clear that states have
full discretion in how those electors are chosen as long as “no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States” is appointed to the role.92
These electors, once appointed by their respective states, are to meet in the state in which they
are selected from and cast their votes for the President of the United States.93 In theory, as
Hamilton discusses in Federalist 68, “A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens
from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite
to such complicated investigations” as to who should be elected president.94 Additionally,
Hamilton explains that the reasons for having the electors meet in their respective states and not
all together is that “this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and
ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be
convened at one time, in one place.”95 However, the first aspect of Hamilton’s reasoning quickly
proved to be detached from the realities of government.
As early as the first competitive presidential election in United States history in 1796,
many of the states themselves and the parties that ran them decided that it was in their best
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interest that the entirety of a state’s electoral votes go for a particular candidate. By 1796, 12 of
the 16 states allocated their electoral votes in a winner-take-all fashion and three of those that
did not only allocated one vote for the candidate of the opposite party.96 Regardless of how the
parties were represented amongst the voters of the state and, more specifically, amongst the
legislators in the state legislature, the majority party would ensure that all of the votes went for
a single candidate. This practice served two power-maximization purposes. The first was the
power of the party selecting the slate of electors that would choose the president while the
second was the power of the state in relation to other states. While it seems politically natural
that a party would seek to give their candidate every advantage in an election by maximizing
their vote count, the power of the individual states was a contentious issue that extended to the
power a state had in the federal government. Thus, the practice of slating electors as a group
essentially becomes an application of game theory where the implementation of a winner-takeall system in one state drives all the other states to implement the same system to avoid being
left behind and relatively weaker. As a result of this gamesmanship among the states, today 48
states allocate their electors via a winner-take-all system with the only exceptions being Maine
and Nebraska, which will be discussed later.97
The automatic plan seeks to make this officially unofficial practice of winner-take-all
legally binding by “automatically” allocating the votes that electors cast today for the candidates
that win the popular votes in each of the states and thus eliminating the need for electors. While
some versions of the plan would maintain the discretion that states currently hold in allocating
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their electors by only eliminating the individuals from the process, the version of the automatic
plan being discussed here would involve moving every state to a winner-take-all system. The
perceived fault of the Electoral College that this system would remedy is the instance of the
“faithless elector,” or an elector that does not vote for the candidate that he or she had pledged
to vote for when selected as an elector. However, in the course of United States presidential
elections, only 165 so-called faithless electors have ever cast electoral votes.98 63 of those votes
were cast in 1872 when Horace Greeley died after election day but before the Electoral College
cast their votes.99 When it came time to vote, only three of his 66 pledged electors voted for
him.100 Additionally, 75 of those faithless electors were for vice presidential candidates, not
presidential ones, and they have never impacted the outcome of an election, only altering the
final electoral vote tallies.101 Although a relatively minor “problem” in the grand scheme of the
Electoral College, faithless electors may have their power of discretion over their votes
reaffirmed or stripped away in the coming months as the Supreme Court hears conflicting
appeals from two district courts, one in Colorado and another in Washington, regarding the
control that states have over their electors after they have been chosen.102 If the court rules that
states can legally restrict the voting behavior of their electors after their selection, the automatic
plan will be enacted in all but name and without a constitutional amendment, which would be
required to implement the plan in its entirety.
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Beyond the elimination of risk of a faithless elector altering the outcome of an election
with a vote that goes against the candidate they were selected for, the automatic plan would
only change electoral practice for the two states that do not select electors strictly on the
outcome of the statewide popular vote: Maine and Nebraska. Both states use a combination of
the statewide popular vote and the popular vote in each of its congressional districts to select
electors, the details of which will be addressed in the congressional district plan.103 The
implementation of the automatic plan, which would require a constitutional amendment that is
passed with two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and the ratification of three
quarters of the states in order to become law, would force Maine and Nebraska to give up their
current systems and require all states to give up the power to determine for themselves how to
select and instruct electors, although there are versions in which this would not be the case, as
mentioned above.
The winners under such a plan would be those that believe the Electoral College is still a
valid and useful method of selecting the president but believe that its kinks, like independent
electors, should be ironed out. Thinking more politically, Republicans would generally win in this
situation as they would solidify the functioning of the Electoral College and could claim to be
tweaking it enough to bring it into the 21st century and away from the subtle paternalism of the
18th. Losers under the automatic plan would be the states that have now had part of their power
guaranteed under the Constitution further subsumed by the federal government. Another
segment would be those that desired deeper changes to the electoral system or complete
replacement of the Electoral College as the implementation of the automatic plan would require
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the immense amount of effort and campaigning that is associated with passing a constitutional
amendment for very little change.
The impact on minority groups when compared to the Electoral College as currently
constructed would be unchanged. As the main structures of the Electoral College would remain
in place, nothing regarding voting districts, gerrymandering, or voting access would be neither
positively nor negatively impacted. As a result, the automatic plan would have no effect on any
groups.
As for the issues of the Electoral College the automatic plan would be resolving, only the
phenomenon of faithless electors and the so-far unrealized risk of them altering the outcome of
an election would be corrected. The automatic plan is by far the simplest of those that will be
detailed in this paper in terms of deviation from the system of today and the limited impact it
would have on the American electoral system reflects that. In the next plan, however, the polar
opposite will be the case.
Direct Election
Also known as the national popular vote, direct election of the president is the most
logically straightforward of the options that will be discussed here. In a democracy, it simply
makes sense that the people would choose the president by casting their votes for the candidate
of their choosing and whoever gets the most votes wins. However, as many things that involve
the United States government and politics, it’s not that simple. Moving from the Electoral College
of today to the direct election of the president would entail not only a constitutional amendment,
but consideration of what happens when no single candidate wins a majority, how to account for
the rise of third party candidates, how the strategies of parties would change, and how the role
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of the states would change in the American federal system. Additionally, the United States would
become the largest country in the world that directly elects its head of government, a logistical
challenge not only for the casting and counting of votes, but also for the physical and cyber
security of a system that would become highly centralized. While the challenges are certainly
numerous, one must also examine the purported virtues of such a system in order to make a
complete judgement of its merits.
In theory, the implementation of direct election via a nationwide popular vote would be
relatively straightforward. Following the passage of a constitutional amendment that requires
the same two-thirds of Congress and three quarters of states to become law, one should be able
to create an infrastructure that takes all the vote totals flowing in from around the country on
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of every other even-numbered year and
start counting. Even the infrastructure and the counting would not be all that difficult to come
by: every news channel covering Election Day has a running popular vote tally. The Federal
Election Commission and National Archives keeps vote totals by state for every United States
federal election as well, which is part of the reason that one can look back through history and
see which elections resulted in split elections where one candidate won a majority of the
electoral vote but lost the popular vote to another candidate.104 Moving to the direct election of
the president would eliminate the phenomenon of the mismatch election and, with it, faithless
electors. It is this reason, the ability to eliminate mismatch elections that appear to be antithetical
to democracy, that is most appealing to many that support the direct election of the president.
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However, there are many concerns and shortcomings that would need to be ironed out before
such a plan could come into effect without a hitch.
The first such issue would arise when pluralities occur in an election. If no single candidate
can claim to have the support of a majority of the people, who becomes the president? In 19 of
the 58 presidential elections that have taken place throughout the history of the United States,
no candidate won a majority of the popular vote.105 Only once in the 39 other elections has the
candidate that won a majority of the popular vote not won a majority of the electoral, in 1876.106
Although the Electoral College does have the ability to flip an election and give a candidate that
did not win the popular vote the electoral majority, it is historically much more likely to create a
majority for the candidate that wins a plurality of the vote. This creates an element of closure
that is not seen in other non-parliamentary democracies. France, for example, directly elects its
president, but does so in two rounds of voting if no candidate wins a majority of the votes on the
first round.107 Therefore, many candidates will run at the start of a campaign simply hoping to
make it into the top two that get to compete in the second round and are thus guaranteed a
majority. While there is certainly nothing inherently wrong about a two-round system, doing the
same in the United States would present a significantly greater challenge than that faced in
France. First, the United States is a significantly larger country, both geographically and by
population. Holding two elections within a few weeks of each other would require mobilizing all
of the resources that are mobilized for an election at all levels of government twice in a short
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time frame. Second, the American federal system is well served by having a single day in
November on which citizens can vote for all offices for which there are elections in their area.
Even with representation at the local, state, and federal level, Americans do all of their voting on
a single day. Asking voters to come out to their polling place again a few weeks later to cast a
single vote for president would simply seem silly when a voter’s interests were already expressed
at so many other levels of government, which leads into the final point. Turnout could easily be
expected to decline sharply on this second round of voting as voters who initially chose a
candidate that did not reach the final round would be even more disincentivized to vote, selecting
their second or third choice candidate and nothing else, having expressed their desires for other
offices weeks earlier. As seen in the most recent French presidential election in 2017, turnout
declined 13% from the first round to the second, a decrease of almost five million votes in France
and nearly 18 million votes in the United States.108
A possible solution to the two-round situation would be ranked choice voting, in which
voters select multiple candidates on a single ballot and rank them in order of preference. To date,
only one state, Maine, uses ranked choice voting for presidential elections but the first election
in which it will be used is 2020.109 How well ranked choice works in Maine will be closely
monitored, but historically, it has been difficult to implement ranked choice voting in two-party
systems like the United States. Much like a traditional direct election system, a possible effect,
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as will be discussed shortly, would be the proliferation of third-party campaigns and candidates
for the presidency.
Another consequence of direct election would be the opening up of the United States
presidential election to third-party candidates. As it currently stands, third-party candidates in
American elections stand effectively zero chance of winning the presidency due to the winnertake-all nature of the races in each of the states. Ross Perot provides perhaps the best example
of a nationally popular third-party candidate that failed to register on the electoral chart. Running
as an independent candidate in 1992, Perot finished the campaign with almost 19% of the
popular vote yet failed to receive a single electoral vote.110 Because Perot did not win the plurality
of the votes in any of the states, he did not receive the electoral votes from those states.
However, in the same vein, a third-party candidate with strong support in a particular state or
region can disproportionately impact the electoral vote. The premier example of the strong
regional candidate is George Wallace mounting a third-party campaign in the 1968 election.
Known for his segregationist stances, Wallace won five states and 46 electoral votes in the South
with 13.5% of the popular vote.111 Despite underperforming Perot by roughly five percentage
points, Wallace was able to pick up eight percentage points more electoral votes than Perot by
having a concentrated base of support in a few states. Even with his concentrated base of
support, however, Wallace was afflicted by the tendency of the Electoral College to
underrepresent the support a losing candidate holds while overstating support for a winning one.
Although moving to a direct election system would not move Perot or Wallace any closer to
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actually winning the presidency, it would more accurately reflect the fact that Perot
outperformed Wallace nationally, even if the electoral votes would say otherwise, a more
democratically intuitive outcome.
Perhaps the biggest sticking point about proposals to move to direct election is the
resulting change in campaign and party strategy that would accompany the move. A common
line of attack on the Electoral College of today is that presidential elections are only ever decided
by a handful of so-called swing states that have populations that could swing either direction
with their support. When most other states can pretty easily be sorted out into electoral piles for
one candidate or the other, the few that cannot receive the lion’s share of advertising dollars,
handshakes, and stump speeches as each candidate seeks their route to the 270 votes needed to
secure the presidency. The relatively small proportion of the population that ends up deciding
the election is often much derided by opponents of the Electoral College. Instead, if direct
election were in effect, candidates would be best served by campaigning strictly in the most
populous areas of the country where their advertising dollars, rallies, and campaign events would
be most effective. Why go to small town Ohio when you can go to coastal California, New York
City, or Chicago?
As with each of the other plans, there are winners and losers to direct election. The
winners would be the regions just mentioned and other high population, high density areas that
can deliver a large trove of votes at low cost. Some other winners would be third parties and their
candidates, long sequestered to the fringes of American politics and elections by the Democratic
and Republican Parties, as well as those that seek a more straightforward electoral system that
is easier to understand. Politically speaking, Democrats would certainly be winners under this
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plan as their support is heavily concentrated in America’s urban areas and recent electoral history
has them winning increasing proportions of the popular vote each election cycle. The losers
under direct election would be those states that are lucky enough to be deemed swing states in
any given election cycle, a title that is significantly fickler than population trends are. Rural areas
also major losers under this plan, as they would essentially be ignored at the expense of
campaigning in more efficient areas for vote collecting while today, they are highly sought after
in the right states.
Minority groups are also significantly impacted by this plan, and not in a positive way.
Under the Electoral College as it stands today, minority groups hold a significantly greater degree
of power than they would under direct election. In the Electoral College, the presidency is
decided by what is effectively 51 distinct races that are worth different numbers of electoral
votes. Each of those races are contested on a much smaller scale than a direct election would be
contested on. With smaller scale, as Madison would note in Federalist ten, factions and groups
can have a much larger influence then they can on a larger scale.112 The factionalism that Madison
hoped to stave off with a larger republic is the same type of power that minority groups would
seek to exert; the type of power that is most effective in smaller republics. By competing in
elections that are much smaller than a single national election, minority groups are shielded from
being drowned out by major population centers and majority groups from faraway regions. Thus,
under a direct election plan, minority groups would definitely be classified as losers. For example,
American Indian populations make up a tiny fraction of the population of the United States as a
whole, but comprise at least five percent of the population in Alaska, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
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South Dakota, Montana, and North Dakota. When compared to the less than one percent they
comprise of the United States population as a whole, American Indians in particular are
disadvantaged by a direct election system.
The direct election plan is perhaps the most dramatic of the plans that will be discussed
in this paper. Involving burning the entire system down and working solely with the nationwide
popular vote, direct election is appealing as a straightforward and simple democratic option.
However, when one digs deeper into the functioning of such a system and the groups that would
be disadvantaged by direct election, serious concerns can be raised about both its simplicity and
democratic bona fides. For the third plan, we return to simply tweaking the Electoral College, but
with a little help from Maine and Nebraska.
The Congressional District Plan
The third plan that will be covered is the congressional district plan, also sometimes
referred to as the proportional plan. The essence of this plan would essentially involve turning
every state into Maine and Nebraska and using their method of assigning electors based not only
on the outcome of the popular vote statewide, but on the popular vote in each congressional
district. As currently constructed, Maine and Nebraska split the allocation of their electoral votes
into those that represent the statewide preference and those that represent the preference of
the districts within those states.113 For winning the statewide vote, a candidate receives two
electoral votes from each state, reflecting the two electoral votes that are assigned based on the
statewide selection of senators. The remaining electoral votes are distributed based on who wins
each of the congressional districts within that state, so if candidate A wins the popular vote
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statewide and in one of the congressional districts and candidate B wins the popular vote in the
two other congressional districts, candidate A would win three electoral votes and candidate B
would win two out of the five total this hypothetical state has to allocate. Putting this plan into
practice would involve changing the remining 48 states to the Maine and Nebraska model for
electoral allocation, moving them from outliers to trendsetters.
The benefits of such a plan are that it would not require a Constitutional Amendment to
implement and that it would lessen the spread that can feasibly occur between the popular vote
and the electoral vote. Due to the wide latitude that states are given when it comes to allocating
the electoral votes that they are assigned; no constitutional amendment would need to be
passed in order to make such a plan a reality. As Maine and Nebraska have already shown,
moving to this method of allocation would simply require an act of the state legislature. However,
whether it is easier to pass a constitutional amendment or convince 48 state legislatures to move
to this system is up for debate. Additionally, without a firm, federal statute that would hold states
to this system, the same game theoretic forces that drove the vast majority of the states to adopt
a winner-take-all system would still be present. California would likely be hesitant to hamstring
its own power in selecting the president by splitting its 55 electoral votes across its congressional
districts. As for the effect that such a plan would have on the risk of a mismatch between the
popular and electoral vote totals, the risk would be lowered by the decrease in the distortions of
the winner-take-all system. By making each district rather than each state an independent
contest, the absolute size of a margin of victory in an individual district is significantly limited.
Without the ability to run up huge margins without sacrificing any electoral votes, it would
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become significantly more difficult to win an election without winning the popular vote.
However, this plan would create some other distortions of its own.
One of the first distortions would come in the effect it would have on the power of
differently sized states. As currently constructed, the Electoral College favors voters in small
states over large states. By guaranteeing a minimum of three electoral votes per state, the voters
per electoral vote ratio in Wyoming is significantly lower than that in California, making a vote in
Wyoming count for relatively more than a vote in California. Under the congressional district
plan, that gap would be widened. Smaller states have fewer congressional districts across which
to allocate their share of the electoral votes, making it more likely that a candidate can sweep all
of the votes from a small state and effectively maintaining the power that that state held under
the winner-take-all system. For example, since Maine implemented the congressional district
plan in 1972 and Nebraska did in 1996, only twice, in 2008 and 2016, has either of the states split
their electoral vote.114 A large state, on the other hand, has more districts across which to allocate
electoral votes. With more districts comes a higher risk of splitting the electoral votes of that
state across multiple candidates, further weakening the power that that state holds in selecting
the president and the power of the majority in that state to wield that power as well.
A second distortion would arise in how congressional districts get treated in an election
under this system. If congressional districts are to count for the allocation of electoral votes as
well as the election of United States representatives, a presidential election simply moves from
being about winning states to winning districts. The same electoral phenomenon that results in
a handful of swing states deciding an election every four years would move to a smaller
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subdivision with the creation of swing districts. As much as some Americans bristle at the
prospect of Floridians and Ohioans deciding who the president will be, imagine the response to
an election decided by the voters of a congressional district in suburban Atlanta or Chicago.
Furthermore, unlike states, the borders and makeups of congressional districts change every ten
years and it is no secret that those borders are drawn with the interest of the ruling party at the
time in mind. Gerrymandering districts would take on a whole new level of importance, deciding
not only who gets the majority in the House of Representatives, but also the White House.
As no voting system is neutral, this plan creates its own winners and losers just as each of
the others. The winners in this system would be those that believe mismatch elections are a stain
on American democracy. While it would not eliminate the possibility of a mismatch entirely as
direct election would, it would certainly lower the probability of such an election taking place
and the scale at which it would take place. Additionally, small states would be winners in this
scenario as many would see their already disproportionate power unchanged or changed very
little while big states would see significant decreases thus making them losers.
A final major winner under this plan might be minority groups. As much as the Electoral
College already helps minority groups wield political power by breaking elections into 51
individual races, the congressional district plan would operate similarly but to an even greater
degree by breaking races into 485 races with slight overlaps in 50 of them. However, there is a
risk that minorities are gerrymandered into districts where their votes are drowned out by a
larger majority, thus leaving the true benefit or cost to them somewhat dependent on where
they live.
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While this plan does not require a constitutional amendment to put into practice, it does
require the full cooperation of all the states in order to be effective. The next plan, the interstate
compact, similarly does not require a constitutional amendment to implement, but only requires
the willing participation of enough states to set the course for the entire country.
The Interstate Compact
The interstate compact refers to the plan that is perhaps the closest to becoming a reality.
Already signed onto by 15 states and the District of Columbia, the compact pledges each of its
signatories to cast their electoral votes for the winner of the nationwide popular vote.115
However, the compact only comes into effect when the 270 vote threshold of electoral votes is
accounted for amongst the states that have signed on, thus guaranteeing that the winner of the
popular vote nationwide, regardless of where those votes originate from, would win the requisite
electoral votes to become president.116 To date, that threshold has not been reached and no
states controlled by Republicans have signed on, likely due to the recognition, in light of Trump’s
election in 2016, that it would hurt their candidates if it were to come into effect.117 Additionally,
while the interstate compact would not require a constitutional amendment to become effective
as it only operates within the latitude of the states to decide how their electors are selected,
interstate compacts do require approval from Congress, as “No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,” approval that would be
unlikely to come as long as Republicans control at least one of the House of Representatives or
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Senate.118 It appears that this clause would conflict with the clause in Article II that gives sole
discretion to the states to decide how to allocate their electors, however, only a court ruling
would provide clarity on the issue.
Because this plan is essentially just engineering the Electoral College into a direct election
apparatus, the resulting impact on the country at large would remain very similar to that of direct
election. The same questions regarding who wins when no one wins a majority would arise, but
also include the aforementioned question of approval. Just as discussed above, the winners
under this plan would be high population and high-density regions of the country that can deliver
many votes efficiently. As one can tell by the concentrated support for the compact in Democratcontrolled states, Democrats would win under this proposal while Republicans would lose as
moving to essentially a winner-take-all system would favor large urban centers that tend to
deliver huge quantities of votes for Democrats. Same for the impact on minority groups. By
turning smaller elections into a huge nationwide election, the risk of being drowned out by an
overwhelming majority on the other side of the country is a significant risk, lessening their ability
to wield political power and have their concerns heard.
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Chapter IV: The Wyoming Plan
While the four proposals that were discussed prior are each legitimate proposals for the
replacement or alteration of the Electoral College with varying degrees of seriousness and
likelihoods of being implemented, as well as their own pros and cons, this final proposal is one
that will be examined significantly more in depth and with the goal of convincing the reader of
its merits. The so-called Wyoming Rule has gotten significantly less play in the popular media but
includes many of the same hallmarks of the plans previously discussed. For example, the
Wyoming Rule would correct some of the perceived injustices of the Electoral College system
while also having a clear, albeit similarly less than pragmatic, path to implementation. Named for
the current least-populous state in the Union, the Wyoming Rule relies on that smallest statewide
population as an integral divisor for the rule. Under a Wyoming Rule system, every ten years
following the decennial United States Census, Congress would resize itself to ensure that there
were enough representatives to make the average population of a congressional district close to
the size of the least populous state. Following that, seats in the House of Representatives would
be apportioned as they currently are using a mathematical formula that is outside the realm of
discussion for this paper.
Implementing the Wyoming Rule would require no changes to the United States
Constitution, instead involving only an act of Congress every ten years and the political inertia to
make it so. Not changing the Constitution means maintaining the Electoral College as it is. It
would still be composed of electors chosen by the states, still select the president following
election day, and electors would still be allocated among the states as the sum total of a states’
congressional delegation. The effect of the Wyoming Rule comes in as a change to the states’
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congressional delegation. By adding or subtracting seats in the House of Representatives every
census, the size of congressional delegations would change more frequently and thus so would
the number of electors a state had in the Electoral College. By maintaining the function of the
Electoral College as currently constructed, the Wyoming Rule in itself does nothing in terms of
changing the validity or fairness of the presidential electoral system. Instead, the Wyoming Rule
seeks to mitigate some of the electoral inequities that are present in the American electoral
system as its method of improving the perceived fairness and validity of American elections.
Due to the Constitutional mandate of each state, regardless of population, receiving a
minimum of one representative and two senators, the lowest number of electoral votes a state
can cast is three. With a guarantee of two senators for every state, small states and their
residents are able to wield outsized power by having fewer people per electoral vote that is cast.
For example, Wyoming, the least populated state as of the 2010 Census, has 187,875 people per
each of its three Electoral College votes.119 California, by contrast as the most populated state,
had 677,345 people per each of its 55 Electoral College votes.120 Therefore, a voter in Wyoming
is over three and a half times as powerful when casting a vote for president than a voter in
California, with the other 48 states falling somewhere in between. However, it is not only the
inclusion of two senators that skews the electoral math in Wyoming’s favor.
The second culprit of the influence that Wyoming holds is the one representative that the
state receives. As of the 2010 Census, the average congressional district in the United States had
708,377 people represented by a single representative.121 Wyoming’s population in 2010 was
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only 563,625, meaning that compared to the average American, Wyoming’s citizens were
overrepresented.122 While representation in Congress is not the focus of this paper, it still plays
an important role in how states are represented in the Electoral College. Since the passage of the
Reapportionment Act of 1929, Congress has had its size fixed at 435 seats with only one exception
in 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union and each received a single
representative outside of the normal reapportionment process.123 In the time since, the
population of the United States has increased dramatically without a corresponding increase in
seats, leading to the swelling of congressional districts and the spread between the district sizes
that is seen today. The combination of ever-larger districts and the Constitutional guarantee of
two senators per state has created the inequalities of representation that are seen today. While
the number of senators per state is something that cannot be changed without changing the very
fabric of American representative government, the sizes of congressional districts is something
that can as they have throughout the growth of the nation. That is exactly what the Wyoming
Rule seeks to do.
The Math
As mentioned earlier, the way that seats are apportioned in the United States Congress
is determined by a mathematical formula consisting of square roots, divisors, and variables that
is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the tables below will provide the necessary
information for understanding where the Wyoming Rule would start from and the impact it
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would have on the way Congress and the Electoral College is formed. The table below provides
the states and their populations as of the 2010 census and the number of seats and electoral
votes allocated to each, as well as a simple calculation of the number of citizens per electoral
college vote in each state.124
State
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Population Seat Count Electoral Votes People per Electoral Vote

Alabama

4,779,735

7

9

531,082

Alaska

710,230

1

3

236,743

Arizona

6,392,015

9

11

581,092

Arkansas

2,915,920

4

6

485,987

California

37,253,955

53

55

677,345

Colorado

5,029,195

7

9

558,799

Connecticut

3,574,095

5

7

510,585

Delaware

897,935

1

3

299,312

Florida

18,801,310

27

29

648,321

Georgia

9,687,655

14

16

605,478

Hawaii

1,360,300

2

4

340,075

Idaho

1,567,580

2

4

391,895

Illinois

12,830,630

18

20

641,532

Indiana

6,483,800

9

11

589,436
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Iowa

3,046,355

4

6

507,726

Kansas

2,853,120

4

6

475,520

Kentucky

4,339,365

6

8

542,421

Louisiana

4,533,370

6

8

566,671

Maine

1,328,360

2

4

332,090

Maryland

5,773,550

8

10

577,355

Massachusetts

6,547,630

9

11

595,239

Michigan

9,883,640

14

16

617,728

Minnesota

5,303,925

8

10

530,393

Mississippi

2,967,295

4

6

494,549

Missouri

5,988,925

8

10

598,893

Montana

989,415

1

3

329,805

Nebraska

1,826,340

3

5

365,268

Nevada

2,700,550

4

6

450,092

New Hampshire

1,316,470

2

4

329,118

New Jersey

8,791,895

12

14

627,993

New Mexico

2,059,180

3

5

411,836

New York

19,378,100

27

29

668,210

North Carolina

9,535,485

13

15

635,699

North Dakota

672,590

1

3

224,197

Ohio

11,536,505

16

18

640,917
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Oklahoma

3,751,350

5

7

535,907

Oregon

3,831,075

5

7

547,296

Pennsylvania

12,702,380

18

20

635,119

Rhode Island

1,052,565

2

4

263,141

South Carolina

4,625,365

7

9

513,929

South Dakota

814,180

1

3

271,393

Tennessee

6,346,105

9

11

576,919

Texas

25,145,560

36

38

661,725

Utah

2,763,885

4

6

460,648

Vermont

625,740

1

3

208,580

Virginia

8,001,025

11

13

615,463

Washington

6,724,540

10

12

560,378

West Virginia

1,852,995

3

5

370,599

Wisconsin

5,686,985

8

10

568,699

Wyoming

563,625

1

3

187,875

As one can see, the variation in people per electoral vote is wide, ranging from Wyoming to
California. For the more statistically minded, below are some summary statistics for the people
per electoral vote:
Average

491,941

Median

533,494

Standard Deviation 139,431
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To calculate what the size of Congress would have been following the 2010 Census under the
Wyoming Rule, one simply takes the population of the entire country less Washington, District
of Columbia and divides it by the population of the smallest state, Wyoming. That calculation
would be 308,143,795 divided by 563,625 for an answer of 547 after some light rounding.125 For
comparison, there are currently 435 seats in the House of Representatives meaning that the
implementation of the Wyoming Rule following the 2010 Census would have added 112 seats to
Congress.126 Now that a seat number has been calculated, one can simply use the preexisting
apportionment method and add seats to the equation in order to get the hypothetical seat counts
and corresponding electoral votes. Those are shown below in the table.
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

125
126

Seat Count Electoral Votes People per Electoral Vote
9
11
434,521
1
3
236,743
11
13
491,693
5
7
416,560
66
68
547,852
9
11
457,200
6
8
446,762
2
4
224,484
33
35
537,180
17
19
509,877
2
4
340,075
3
5
313,516
23
25
513,225
12
14
463,129
5
7
435,194
5
7
407,589
8
10
433,937
8
10
453,337
2
4
332,090
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Maryland
10
12
481,129
Massachusetts
12
14
467,688
Michigan
18
20
494,182
Minnesota
9
11
482,175
Mississippi
5
7
423,899
Missouri
11
13
460,687
Montana
2
4
247,354
Nebraska
3
5
365,268
Nevada
5
7
385,793
New Hampshire
2
4
329,118
New Jersey
16
18
488,439
New Mexico
4
6
343,197
New York
34
36
538,281
North Carolina
17
19
501,868
North Dakota
1
3
224,197
Ohio
20
22
524,387
Oklahoma
7
9
416,817
Oregon
7
9
425,675
Pennsylvania
23
25
508,095
Rhode Island
2
4
263,141
South Carolina
8
10
462,537
South Dakota
2
4
203,545
Tennessee
11
13
488,162
Texas
45
47
535,012
Utah
5
7
394,841
Vermont
1
3
208,580
Virginia
14
16
500,064
Washington
12
14
480,324
West Virginia
3
5
370,599
Wisconsin
10
12
473,915
Wyoming
1
3
187,875
And, just as before, some summary statistics for the statistically inclined:
Average

413,436

Median

440,978

Standard Deviation 101,651
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Compared to the current system, the Wyoming Rule makes some headway on all three summary
statistics in mitigating some of the benefit that small state voters get in the electoral college,
especially in terms of deviation from the mean. With a lower standard deviation, there is less
spread across states in their relative power and thus a generally more equal distribution of
power. Here are the statistics side-by-side:
Measure
Current Wyoming Rule Percentage Decrease
Average
491,941
413,436
16%
Median
533,494
440,978
17%
Standard Deviation 139,431
101,651
27%
More specifically, here are the state-by-state changes in people per electoral vote under the
Wyoming Rule:
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Current Wyoming Rule Percentage Decrease
531,082
434,521
18%
236,743
236,743
0%
581,092
491,693
15%
485,987
416,560
14%
677,345
547,852
19%
558,799
457,200
18%
510,585
446,762
12%
299,312
224,484
25%
648,321
537,180
17%
605,478
509,877
16%
340,075
340,075
0%
391,895
313,516
20%
641,532
513,225
20%
589,436
463,129
21%
507,726
435,194
14%
475,520
407,589
14%
542,421
433,937
20%
566,671
453,337
20%
332,090
332,090
0%
577,355
481,129
17%
595,239
467,688
21%
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Michigan
617,728
494,182
20%
Minnesota
530,393
482,175
9%
Mississippi
494,549
423,899
14%
Missouri
598,893
460,687
23%
Montana
329,805
247,354
25%
Nebraska
365,268
365,268
0%
Nevada
450,092
385,793
14%
New Hampshire 329,118
329,118
0%
New Jersey
627,993
488,439
22%
New Mexico
411,836
343,197
17%
New York
668,210
538,281
19%
North Carolina 635,699
501,868
21%
North Dakota 224,197
224,197
0%
Ohio
640,917
524,387
18%
Oklahoma
535,907
416,817
22%
Oregon
547,296
425,675
22%
Pennsylvania 635,119
508,095
20%
Rhode Island
263,141
263,141
0%
South Carolina 513,929
462,537
10%
South Dakota 271,393
203,545
25%
Tennessee
576,919
488,162
15%
Texas
661,725
535,012
19%
Utah
460,648
394,841
14%
Vermont
208,580
208,580
0%
Virginia
615,463
500,064
19%
Washington
560,378
480,324
14%
West Virginia 370,599
370,599
0%
Wisconsin
568,699
473,915
17%
Wyoming
187,875
187,875
0%
Therefore, adding seats to Congress would not only help shrink the average congressional district
and improve representation in Congress, but it would also help close the gap between the
relatively most powerful voters and the relatively least powerful in presidential elections.
In a 2010 Wyoming Rule, because the number of seats increased, no state would have its
absolute congressional representation and subsequent electoral representation decreased.
However, a handful of states would see no change in their representation and therefore a
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decrease in their relative representation as the total number of seats rose. Below is the seat
counts for the two systems by state.127
State
Current Wyoming Rule Increase
Alabama
7
9
2
Alaska
1
1
0
Arizona
9
11
2
Arkansas
4
5
1
California
53
66
13
Colorado
7
9
2
Connecticut
5
6
1
Delaware
1
2
1
Florida
27
33
6
Georgia
14
17
3
Hawaii
2
2
0
Idaho
2
3
1
Illinois
18
23
5
Indiana
9
12
3
Iowa
4
5
1
Kansas
4
5
1
Kentucky
6
8
2
Louisiana
6
8
2
Maine
2
2
0
Maryland
8
10
2
Massachusetts
9
12
3
Michigan
14
18
4
Minnesota
8
9
1
Mississippi
4
5
1
Missouri
8
11
3
Montana
1
2
1
Nebraska
3
3
0
Nevada
4
5
1
New Hampshire
2
2
0
New Jersey
12
16
4
New Mexico
3
4
1
New York
27
34
7
North Carolina
13
17
4
127
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North Dakota
1
1
0
Ohio
16
20
4
Oklahoma
5
7
2
Oregon
5
7
2
Pennsylvania
18
23
5
Rhode Island
2
2
0
South Carolina
7
8
1
South Dakota
1
2
1
Tennessee
9
11
2
Texas
36
45
9
Utah
4
5
1
Vermont
1
1
0
Virginia
11
14
3
Washington
10
12
2
West Virginia
3
3
0
Wisconsin
8
10
2
Wyoming
1
1
0
Total
435
547
112
Ten states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming—would see no change in their seat counts. The ten
highest gainers would be, in order: California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Ohio. Only California would see double digit gains with
13 added seats.
The people per electoral vote ratio would see changes as well, although not drastic ones.
Below are the ten states with the lowest ratios in ascending order under the current system as
well as under the Wyoming Rule.
Current
Wyoming
Vermont
North Dakota
Alaska
Rhode Island
South Dakota

187,875
208,580
224,197
236,743
263,141
271,393

Wyoming Rule
Wyoming
187,875
South Dakota 203,545
Vermont
208,580
North Dakota 224,197
Delaware
224,484
Alaska
236,743
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Delaware
299,312
Montana
247,354
New Hampshire 329,118
Rhode Island
263,141
Montana
329,805
Idaho
313,516
Maine
332,090 New Hampshire 329,118
While the order of the states on this list changes completely with the exception of Wyoming, only
Maine is removed from the first list in favor of Idaho on the second. Although the Wyoming Rule
would help shrink the gap between the largest and smallest states in terms of relative power, it
would have a limited impact on the power of the states positionally as the smallest states would
still be the smallest states. Furthermore, here are the ten states with the highest people to
electoral vote ratios under both the current and Wyoming Rule systems in descending order.
Current
Wyoming Rule
California
677,345
California
547,852
New York
668,210
New York
538,281
Texas
661,725
Florida
537,180
Florida
648,321
Texas
535,012
Illinois
641,532
Ohio
524,387
Ohio
640,917
Illinois
513,225
North Carolina 635,699
Georgia
509,877
Pennsylvania 635,119 Pennsylvania 508,095
New Jersey
627,993 North Carolina 501,868
Michigan
617,728
Virginia
500,064
The pattern is much the same as the prior list, with California and New York topping both lists
and Pennsylvania claiming the eighth spot on both. New Jersey and Michigan claim spots on the
first while Georgia and Virginia replace them on the second, again showing the limited room that
exists for movement to and from positions of power relative to other states. Interesting to note
is the size of the decreases in people per vote ratio on the second list relative to the first. For
example, a Wyoming Rule California would be 70 thousand people shy of even making the top
ten on the highest ratios list under the current system.
Effects
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Just as with Chapter III, analyzing the effects that implementing the Wyoming Rule would
unleash is just as important as understanding the details of the plan itself. Continuing with the
spirit of the chapter, the analysis of the effects for the Wyoming Rule will take on a more
thorough approach than some of the more common proposals for altering the Electoral College.
This section will still cover the same details regarding legality, winners and losers, impact on
minority groups, and how it addresses some of the issues of the Electoral College as currently
constructed.
Legality
Part of the appeal of the Wyoming Rule is that it does not require an amendment to the
Constitution in order to implement. By working within the framework of the Electoral College as
laid out in the Constitution, notably the stipulation that a state gets electoral votes equal to the
sum total of the representatives and senators a state sends to Congress, the Wyoming Rule is
able to be fully implemented without passing a constitutional amendment. The only legal change
that would need to be made is the addition of seats to the United States House of
Representatives. As mentioned in earlier in the chapter, Congress can legislate its own size as
only the size of the Senate is constitutionally mandated at two senators per state. Even with that
power, Congress has not permanently changed the size of the House of Representatives since
the Reapportionment Act of 1929, which set the size of the House at the 435 seats that it remains
at today.128 The only deviation from 435 occurred in 1959 when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted
to the Union.129 Instead of reapportioning the entirety of the House of Representatives just one
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year in advance of the next census, Congress instead granted the two newest states one
representative each until the completion of the

1960 Census and subsequent

reapportionment.130
While putting the Wyoming Rule into place would only require an act of Congress to
increase the number of seats in the House of Representatives, the legal challenge will come in
with ensuring that that process reoccurs every ten years after each census. The only way to
ensure that Congress is legally required to repeat the process decennially would be to pass an
amendment to the Constitution, slightly defeating the purpose of pursuing the Wyoming Rule to
begin with. Although Congress could technically be trusted to make the requisite changes
themselves, planning a decade into the future is much easier than confronting political realities
in the present. Thus, if the party in power in a given census year projected to be a major loser as
a result of resizing and reapportionment, the political will to make even a routine and technical
correction to American government could quickly evaporate. As soon as something as
nonpartisan as maintaining the functions of American government becomes a political tool, the
Wyoming Rule becomes less of a rule and more a method of wielding and maintaining power.
For this reason, any serious proposal seeking to implement the Wyoming Rule should seek to
create guardrails against the political weaponization of congressional size.
Winners and Losers
Just as with each of the plans before, an analysis of winners and losers under the
Wyoming Rule is in order. Winners would include people that believe that the Electoral College
is a suitable method for selecting the president and would prefer to leave it intact. Similarly,
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those that generally are okay with the Electoral College but believe that some more incremental
changes are needed in order to keep it relevant for the 21st century could be considered winners.
However, those that would like to see sweeping changes to the electoral system of the United
States—whether via direct election or another method that would require constitutional
change—would be disappointed in the simple tinkering of the system that comes with the
Wyoming Rule. However, there is very limited middle ground. A sizable cadre of minor changes,
like implementing the automatic plan or electing electors by district instead of by state, would
require constitutional amendments. At that point, going through the process of amending the
Constitution is more appealing if it would involve more drastic change. To many, the amendment
process is simply not worth it if the resulting change is marginal.
Politically, the winners and losers are more difficult to define, if there are easily
determined winners and losers at all. Although tempting to say that Republicans running for the
presidency would likely be losers as the low-population states that hold disproportionate power
in the Electoral College would become relatively weaker as high-population states like California,
New York, and Illinois gained seats, the exact effect would be difficult to determine due to the
simple fact that party platforms and campaign strategies would change to reflect a new electoral
system. Even then, it is difficult to determine if Republicans would have even been losers if the
2016 election had been conducted via the Wyoming Rule. While an imperfect guide, under the
Wyoming Rule, if the popular vote counts remained exactly the same, Donald Trump would have
won 370 electoral votes for his 30 states and Maine’s second district while Hillary Clinton would
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have won 280 for her 20 states and the District of Columbia.131 Trump’s 57% of the electoral vote
under the Wyoming Rule would be a tenth of a percentage point more than he won in the actual
2016 election.132
Looking at the only other election to date conducted under 2010 apportionment, 2012,
Mitt Romney would have won 248 electoral votes for his 24 states to Barack Obama’s 402 for 26
states and the District of Columbia if the election was under the Wyoming Rule.133 Romney’s 38%
of the electoral vote is almost exactly what he received in the 2012 election as well.134 While two
elections are certainly a tiny sample size, the overall effect on political power appears to be
benign in the absence of broader platform and strategy shifts by the major parties.
By using the size of Congress to affect how presidential elections are run, Congress would
also see major changes under the Wyoming Rule. However, how the added congressional seats
would affect the balance of power in the legislature is highly dependent on a multitude of other
factors, including who controls redistricting in various states and how campaigning would change
to reflect new political realities. In terms of the power of individual legislators, their individual
power would decrease as seats are added, although the power of the House as an institution
would likely remain unchanged relative to the Senate. Select members of the House, like the
Speaker of the House and committee chairs, would probably see their power increase as they
wield influence over a larger number of representatives and their political operations.
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Continuing on the same vein, small states would be major losers under the Wyoming Rule
as they would see larger states gain lots of seats without picking up many themselves. Not only
would their congressional delegation shrink relative to the size of other states, but their power
in selecting the president would be significantly diminished as well. However, even with a smaller
number of electoral votes and power in the Electoral College, small states would still punch above
their weight on a people per electoral vote basis. By virtue of the way the Electoral College is
designed, the inclusion of two senators for every state regardless of size and the counting of
those senators in the Electoral College will always overrepresent small state residents against big
state residents. Adding seats to large states via the Wyoming Rule would only help narrow the
gap.
Minority Groups
As a bit of an extension to the previous section on winners and losers, how the Wyoming
Rule impacts the fortunes of minority groups also merits discussion. Generally speaking, the
implementation of the Wyoming Rule would be good for minority groups. As discussed in Chapter
II, the Electoral College is a boon for minority groups when compared to a nationwide popular
election. By breaking the country into 51 distinct elections, minority groups within a state can
exert more influence over the outcome of the race in that state. If competing in the context of a
nationwide election, the influence a minority group can wield is greatly reduced. Expanding on
the power of minority groups within states, the power wielded by different groups in different
state varies widely. By making states like California, Texas, and Florida more powerful in electing
the president, minority groups in those states can exert more influence over the election by
influencing a greater number of electoral votes. However, competing in a more powerful state
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also means competing in a more populous state, possibly reducing the influence a minority group
can exert. As a result, although the Wyoming Rule would make certain minority groups in larger
states more powerful relative to minority groups in smaller states, it would not change the power
of the minority groups within their own states in terms of their impact on presidential elections.
While the Wyoming Rule is principally designed for altering the method by which the
President of the United States is elected, by altering the size of Congress the Wyoming Rule also
creates spillover effects for the representation of citizens in the House of Representatives.
Minority groups would become winners under this effect as well, as a greater number of
representatives results in smaller districts and greater representation. With smaller districts, not
only are minority groups less likely to be lumped into a district with a dominant majority, but
they are more likely to be the majority themselves. Smaller districts would thus help minorities
not be powerless in their legislative district and even possibly elect their own representative to
represent their interests. Although the Wyoming Rule would not eliminate the practice of
gerrymandering, it would make it more difficult to gerrymander a district that can effectively
disenfranchise a large swath of minority voters.
Addressing the Issues
The primary issue with the Electoral College as currently constructed that the Wyoming
Rule is meant to address is the imbalance of relative power between small state residents and
large state residents. As an extension of that, the Wyoming Rule is also designed to make
mismatch elections, in which the candidate that wins a majority of the electoral vote does not
win a plurality of the popular vote, less likely and less extreme. By narrowing the relative power
gap between small and large states, candidates have a narrower path to winning the presidency
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without winning a plurality of the popular vote as the states that once provided an outsized
number of electoral votes relative to their population become less powerful.
For example, a candidate that wins the same number of votes in California as they would
under the current electoral system would now receive 68 electoral votes instead of 55. Even to
simply keep pace, the opposing candidate would need to make up those 13 electoral votes. If the
opposing candidate was closing that gap with a collection of small states, they would need to win
the equivalent of seven electoral votes in order to do so. Winning seven electoral votes from the
opposing candidate thereby deprives the opposition of seven votes in the zero-sum game of
electoral politics. To put it in the context of the 2016 election, if Hillary Clinton were to receive
68 electoral votes from California, rather than the 55 she actually received, Donald Trump would
have to win not only all the states he previously won, but also pull, for example, New Hampshire
and Vermont from Clinton as well. While Clinton’s popular vote spread in California would remain
the same, Trump would have to add margins of victory in New Hampshire and Vermont to his
vote total. Trump would only need to win seven additional votes from Clinton to make up the
difference, but Clinton will have done nothing different in order to achieve that lead in the first
place. Therefore, a candidate that wins a large state with a high population would now win even
more electoral votes, helping to counteract the Moneyball-esque electoral-for-popular efficiency
of winning small states with low populations. Although the Electoral College guarantees that
people per electoral vote will never be an equal ratio across the country, adding seats to the
House of Representatives via the Wyoming Rule would help narrow the gap.
Chapter V: Conclusion
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To end, I would like to cover why I believe the Wyoming Rule to be the best option for
bringing the Electoral College into the present and preparing it for the future. To start, I believe
that the Wyoming Rule has the best probability of actually becoming law for two reasons. First,
it does not require a constitutional amendment. By only requiring an act of Congress, the
Wyoming rule can skip the two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress and the ratification
by three-fourths of the states, significantly cutting down on the opportunities for derailment.
Second, as shown by the analysis of what the Wyoming Rule would have done for the 2016 and
2012 elections, it is currently a completely unpartisan change. Although an ex post analysis of
previous elections is not an ideal predictor of what would happen under the Wyoming Rule, it is
the best one can do at the current juncture due to the multitude of factors that would change if
the Wyoming Rule was implemented. While partisan neutrality would ideally not be a deciding
factor in how a congressman would vote to overhaul the electoral system of the United States, it
is a reality of the times that we live in that it is a concern. Compared to the other alternatives
discussed in this paper, save the automatic plan, the Wyoming Rule is by far the most unpartisan,
thus giving neither side a political reason to vote against it. As a result, the Wyoming Rule is the
best chance of getting structural-level electoral reform passed into law in the near future.
There are more than just practical reasons to support to Wyoming Rule. I believe that the
most base-level shortcoming of the Electoral College is the outsized influence it gives small-state
voters on a people per electoral vote basis. While that ratio will never be the same across every
state due to the inclusion of two senators in the calculation, it can and should be mitigated at a
reasonable degree. While one can add seats to the Congress until the ratios are sufficiently small,
that number of seats could lie in the thousands or tens of thousands. Therefore, by tying the
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number of seats in Congress to the population of the smallest state, a nice balance is struck
between narrowing the ratio and maintaining a reasonable number of seats in the House. By not
using an amendment, the Electoral College and the House of Representatives can still act as the
framers intend and ebb and flow with the state of the country. If Wyoming was to have a sudden
population boom, the House could shrink to accommodate the now more even distribution of
the population across the states. Even with a shrinking House, the best way to improve the spread
of the ratios of people to electoral vote is to not have such wide disparities in population, making
the Wyoming Rule a self-correcting mechanism that limits its own influence when that influence
is less needed.
Although this paper focused on the implications the Wyoming Rule would have for
presidential elections and the Electoral College, adding seats to the House would certainly have
implications for the functioning of Congress too. At its most basic, adding seats would improve
representation in Congress by reducing the number of people that live in each congressional
district. With smaller districts and better representation comes more opportunities for minority
groups and factions to have their voices heard through an elected representative. Without a
more detailed analysis that is beyond the purview of this paper, it is impossible to predict how a
larger House as an institution would have its role altered, nor how individual representatives
wield the soft power that comes with their position even if they are officially weaker than their
predecessors in terms of influence on legislation.
Finally, I believe that there are wider benefits to American democracy as a whole that the
Wyoming Rule would usher in. It is no secret that Americans are increasingly being separated
into more polarized camps. Interparty animosity is high, and each party’s candidates speak of the
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other party’s candidates with a scorn that was unfathomable just ten years ago. While there is
certainly an element of politics to the development, I believe there is also a structural basis for
the divide that starts with the Electoral College. The reasoning is market based. With two major
parties, each would take policy positions that it believed would win it a slight majority of what
was at stake. In the case of the presidency, that is electoral votes and in the case of Congress,
that is seats. Doing anything less would be playing to lose and, at that point, then there is not
much reason in playing at all. The issue with the Electoral College is that it divorces what is
needed to win, electoral votes, from democratic intuition, popular votes. In doing so, the
Electoral College creates opportunities for maximizing outcomes on one metric while ignoring
the other, for example allowing the Republican Party to win a sizable majority of electoral votes
with significantly less than a majority of the popular vote. Due to their popularity in generally
smaller states that happen to be relatively more powerful in the Electoral College than large ones,
the Republican Party is able to stake out a platform further to the right than would be necessary
to win a majority of the popular vote. If the advantage held by smaller states was not as large,
then the Republican Party and their candidate would have to move closer to the middle to bring
more states into play. A similar logic holds for the Democratic Party as well. Recognizing that the
Republicans are moving further right, Democrats are given the ability to move further left without
losing the states they would win otherwise. By refusing to compete in a state like California,
Republicans give Democrats free reign to move left without fear of losing California.
The greatest threat that American democracy faces is democracy itself. If polarization and
division become the norm and moderation and compromise become relics of a bygone era, the
United States will struggle to keep the pieces intact. Although it is more speculation than
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anything, I believe that the Wyoming Rule is an excellent way to help ensure that the structures
of American democracy do not ultimately contribute to its demise. Combined with the relative
ease of putting it into practice, the narrowing of ratios of people to popular vote across states,
and the improved representation in the legislature, the Wyoming Rule is the clear choice for
Electoral College reform and, with it, democratic reform for the American republic.
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